Guardian
In the latest instalment of our in-depth series, Jonathan Wilson tracks the rise and fall of a tactical survivor
Some formations come and go, waxing and waning in and out of fashion. When others fade, though, they disappear. Nobody would dream these days of playing a 2-3-5 or a W-M, and it seemed as though 3-5-2 was headed the same way. There are good reasons for that and yet, defying the prevailing wisdom, Napoli have climbed to second in Serie A using the formation. Perhaps, as Carlos Bilardo returns to the spotlight as part of Diego Maradona's coaching staff with the Argentina national team, it is appropriate that the tactics he devised should fall once again under consideration.
The birth of 3-5-2
Bilardo, having been part of Osvaldo Zubeldía's brutal and pragmatic Estudiantes side, was as system-driven as any coach; putting him in charge of an Argentina side featuring one of the greatest individual talents there has ever been seemed like football's great joke. His solution was to make Maradona his captain and to develop a new formation to accommodate him.
Wingers were in decline, becoming auxiliary midfielders, he reasoned, so what was the point of full-backs? They had been becoming increasingly attacking since the early 50s and the days of the great Brazilian Nilton Santos, so why not simply redesignate them as midfielders?
It was desperation that drove Bilardo to experiment on a tour of Europe in 1984. He had won only three of his first 15 games in charge, and his position was under threat. So low had his reputation sunk that when he read out the team to face Switzerland, journalists assumed he had made a mistake. "They told me I was wrong, that I'd named three central defenders," he said. "But I told them I was not confused. We were going to use three defenders, five midfielders and two forwards. We had practised it for two years, and now I was going to put it into practice in tough games."
Switzerland were beaten 2-0, as were Belgium, and then Argentina won 3-1 against West Germany. Bilardo then retreated from the 3-5-2 – perhaps to shield his new formation from spying eyes, or perhaps because he had no grand plan but was constantly tinkering – until it came to the World Cup quarter-final against England two years later. He dropped the centre-forward Pedro Pasculli, who had scored in the previous round against Uruguay, instead deploying the midfielder Héctor Enrique as part of a central trio with Jorge Burruchaga and Sergio Batista. "You can't play against the English with a pure centre-forward," he explained. "They'd devour him, and the extra man in midfield will give Maradona more room." His playmaker, in other words, became a second striker as the shape shifted from 4-3-1-2 to 3-5-2 (or perhaps, more precisely, 3-5-1-1).
How the idea spread
European football had been heading to a similar point. Catenaccio – and the slightly more liberal gioco all'Italiana that followed it – had usually featured a libero, a marking centre-back, a marking right-back who tucked in, and an attacking left-back, with the right-midfielder dropping back where necessary – as a 'tornante', or 'returner'. It didn't take much to play the tornante deeper as what would become known as a right wing-back.
German football had been wedded to a 1-3-3-1-2 since the 1974 World Cup, often with an attacking libero and/or full-backs. In 1986, West Germany's coach Franz Beckenbauer, depending on the opponents, began pushing one of his central midfielders into a deeper role, so that by the time of the World Cup final, they too were effectively using a libero, two markers, two flank defenders who were expected to provide attacking width, two holders in midfield, a playmaker and two centre-forwards – what would become known as a 3-4-1-2, a close cousin of the 3-5-2.
And so the system spread. Variants of 3-5-2 won the World Cup in 1990 (West Germany) and 1994 (Brazil) and the European Championship in 1996 (Germany). Even England, the great stronghold of 4-4-2, experimented with the formation through the 90s. And yet now – outside of Brazil and the Balkans – it is barely seen. Not a single side at Euro 2008 used it; not a single side who reached the last 16 of the Champions League last season used it; not a single side in the Premier League uses it (although Portsmouth did dabble).
Why have teams turned their back on 3-5-2?
José Alberto Cortes, head of the coaching course at the University of São Paulo, believes the issue is physical. "With the pace of the modern game," he said, "it is impossible for wing-backs to function in the same way because they have to be quicker and fitter than the rest of the players on the pitch."
Others, though, see the turn against three at the back as the result of incorporating skilful players by bolstering the midfield. Bilardo's formation, curiously, contained the seeds of its own undoing. If the playmaker is deployed not as a midfielder but as a second forward, he drops deep, leaving only one central striker. Modern attempts to use creative players wide in a 4-2-3-1 or a 4-3-3 equally feature a single central striker. (Here it should be made clear that the modern 4-3-3 – perhaps more accurately a 4-1-2-3 – is significantly different from the 4-3-3 Brazil introduced in 1962, and which was relatively common in Britain in the 70s and early 80s. That system commonly featured two centre-forwards and one winger: it was, in effect, a lopsided 4-4-2, with one wide midfielder more advanced than the other).
Bilardo's scheme had two markers picking up the opposing centre-forwards, with a spare man sweeping behind. If there is only one centre-forward to mark, though, that leaves two spare men – one provides cover; a second is redundant - which in turn means a shortfall elsewhere on the pitch. "There's no point having three defenders covering one centre-forward," explained Miroslav Djukic, the former Valencia defender who became Partizan Belgrade manager in 2007.
An analytical approach
Nelsinho Baptista, the experienced Brazilian coach who took charge of Corinthians in 2007, has developed software to explore the weaknesses of one system when matched against another. "Imagine Team A is playing 3-5-2 against Team B with a 4-5-1 that becomes 4-3-3," he said. "So Team A has to commit the wing-backs to deal with Team B's wingers. That means Team A is using five men to deal with three forwards. In midfield Team A has three central midfielders against three, so the usual advantage of 3-5-2 against 4-4-2 is lost. Then at the front it is two forwards against four defenders, but the spare defenders are full-backs. One can push into midfield to create an extra man there, while still leaving three v two at the back. So Team B can dominate possession, and also has greater width."
One of Team A's central defenders could, of course, himself step up into midfield, but if you're going to do that, it is surely better to use a defensive midfielder in the role (full-backs are rather more used to advancing than central defenders, so it is more natural for them to function as an auxiliary midfielder). Which is precisely what Chelsea do with Mikel Jon Obi, and Shakhtar Donetsk with Mariusz Lewandowski, a holding midfielder allowing the full-backs greater rein.
Putting it into practice
The 2008 African Cup of Nations provides a practical example. Egypt won it with a 3-4-1-2, but that can be explained by the fact that 4-4-2 still tends to dominate tactical thinking in Africa. In fact, in 2008, aside from Egypt – and at times Cameroon - only Guinea and Morocco, both of whom used a 4-2-3-1, did not set up in some form of 4-4-2.
In their opening match, Egypt hammered Cameroon 4-2, a scoreline that flattered their opponents. They went on to add a further 10 goals in disposing of Sudan, Zambia, Angola and Côte d'Ivoire before meeting Cameroon again in the final. In that first game, Cameroon's coach Otto Pfister had his players in a 4-4-2; in the final, he opted for a 4-2-3-1 and, for the first time in the tournament, Egypt struggled for fluency. The central defender Wael Gomaa looked like a spare part, anxiously and uncertainly wandering into midfield, and, although Egypt bossed possession, they ended up beating a limited side only because of a terrible individual error from Rigobert Song.
Signs of recovery
So what, then, of Napoli? If 3-5-2 is ailing, how can their success be accounted for? The answer is that they are quite happy to have, in effect, two liberi. Napoli are not a team who need to take the initiative to the opposition; rather – as happened in the early days of catenaccio – they often sit deep, invite the opposition onto them, and break quickly, using the pace of Ezequiel Lavezzi. Having an extra spare man at the back makes it easier for them to pick up runners, and Edy Reja, their coach, is prepared to sacrifice possession for the extra defensive security.
It would not work for everybody – probably not for a top, top club, who feel the onus to take the game on themselves – but it works for Napoli. And that illuminates a universal truth about tactics: there is no right or wrong, just fads and fashions and systems that are right for particular teams at particular times.
Is 3-5-2 dying? No, but the trend towards one central striker has exposed a serious shortcoming.
Jonathan Wilson is the author of Inverting The Pyramid: The History of Football Tactics, which is shortlisted for this year's William Hill Sports Book of the Year Award.
In the latest instalment of our in-depth series, Jonathan Wilson tracks the rise and fall of a tactical survivor
Some formations come and go, waxing and waning in and out of fashion. When others fade, though, they disappear. Nobody would dream these days of playing a 2-3-5 or a W-M, and it seemed as though 3-5-2 was headed the same way. There are good reasons for that and yet, defying the prevailing wisdom, Napoli have climbed to second in Serie A using the formation. Perhaps, as Carlos Bilardo returns to the spotlight as part of Diego Maradona's coaching staff with the Argentina national team, it is appropriate that the tactics he devised should fall once again under consideration.
The birth of 3-5-2
Bilardo, having been part of Osvaldo Zubeldía's brutal and pragmatic Estudiantes side, was as system-driven as any coach; putting him in charge of an Argentina side featuring one of the greatest individual talents there has ever been seemed like football's great joke. His solution was to make Maradona his captain and to develop a new formation to accommodate him.
Wingers were in decline, becoming auxiliary midfielders, he reasoned, so what was the point of full-backs? They had been becoming increasingly attacking since the early 50s and the days of the great Brazilian Nilton Santos, so why not simply redesignate them as midfielders?
It was desperation that drove Bilardo to experiment on a tour of Europe in 1984. He had won only three of his first 15 games in charge, and his position was under threat. So low had his reputation sunk that when he read out the team to face Switzerland, journalists assumed he had made a mistake. "They told me I was wrong, that I'd named three central defenders," he said. "But I told them I was not confused. We were going to use three defenders, five midfielders and two forwards. We had practised it for two years, and now I was going to put it into practice in tough games."
Switzerland were beaten 2-0, as were Belgium, and then Argentina won 3-1 against West Germany. Bilardo then retreated from the 3-5-2 – perhaps to shield his new formation from spying eyes, or perhaps because he had no grand plan but was constantly tinkering – until it came to the World Cup quarter-final against England two years later. He dropped the centre-forward Pedro Pasculli, who had scored in the previous round against Uruguay, instead deploying the midfielder Héctor Enrique as part of a central trio with Jorge Burruchaga and Sergio Batista. "You can't play against the English with a pure centre-forward," he explained. "They'd devour him, and the extra man in midfield will give Maradona more room." His playmaker, in other words, became a second striker as the shape shifted from 4-3-1-2 to 3-5-2 (or perhaps, more precisely, 3-5-1-1).
How the idea spread
European football had been heading to a similar point. Catenaccio – and the slightly more liberal gioco all'Italiana that followed it – had usually featured a libero, a marking centre-back, a marking right-back who tucked in, and an attacking left-back, with the right-midfielder dropping back where necessary – as a 'tornante', or 'returner'. It didn't take much to play the tornante deeper as what would become known as a right wing-back.
German football had been wedded to a 1-3-3-1-2 since the 1974 World Cup, often with an attacking libero and/or full-backs. In 1986, West Germany's coach Franz Beckenbauer, depending on the opponents, began pushing one of his central midfielders into a deeper role, so that by the time of the World Cup final, they too were effectively using a libero, two markers, two flank defenders who were expected to provide attacking width, two holders in midfield, a playmaker and two centre-forwards – what would become known as a 3-4-1-2, a close cousin of the 3-5-2.
And so the system spread. Variants of 3-5-2 won the World Cup in 1990 (West Germany) and 1994 (Brazil) and the European Championship in 1996 (Germany). Even England, the great stronghold of 4-4-2, experimented with the formation through the 90s. And yet now – outside of Brazil and the Balkans – it is barely seen. Not a single side at Euro 2008 used it; not a single side who reached the last 16 of the Champions League last season used it; not a single side in the Premier League uses it (although Portsmouth did dabble).
Why have teams turned their back on 3-5-2?
José Alberto Cortes, head of the coaching course at the University of São Paulo, believes the issue is physical. "With the pace of the modern game," he said, "it is impossible for wing-backs to function in the same way because they have to be quicker and fitter than the rest of the players on the pitch."
Others, though, see the turn against three at the back as the result of incorporating skilful players by bolstering the midfield. Bilardo's formation, curiously, contained the seeds of its own undoing. If the playmaker is deployed not as a midfielder but as a second forward, he drops deep, leaving only one central striker. Modern attempts to use creative players wide in a 4-2-3-1 or a 4-3-3 equally feature a single central striker. (Here it should be made clear that the modern 4-3-3 – perhaps more accurately a 4-1-2-3 – is significantly different from the 4-3-3 Brazil introduced in 1962, and which was relatively common in Britain in the 70s and early 80s. That system commonly featured two centre-forwards and one winger: it was, in effect, a lopsided 4-4-2, with one wide midfielder more advanced than the other).
Bilardo's scheme had two markers picking up the opposing centre-forwards, with a spare man sweeping behind. If there is only one centre-forward to mark, though, that leaves two spare men – one provides cover; a second is redundant - which in turn means a shortfall elsewhere on the pitch. "There's no point having three defenders covering one centre-forward," explained Miroslav Djukic, the former Valencia defender who became Partizan Belgrade manager in 2007.
An analytical approach
Nelsinho Baptista, the experienced Brazilian coach who took charge of Corinthians in 2007, has developed software to explore the weaknesses of one system when matched against another. "Imagine Team A is playing 3-5-2 against Team B with a 4-5-1 that becomes 4-3-3," he said. "So Team A has to commit the wing-backs to deal with Team B's wingers. That means Team A is using five men to deal with three forwards. In midfield Team A has three central midfielders against three, so the usual advantage of 3-5-2 against 4-4-2 is lost. Then at the front it is two forwards against four defenders, but the spare defenders are full-backs. One can push into midfield to create an extra man there, while still leaving three v two at the back. So Team B can dominate possession, and also has greater width."
One of Team A's central defenders could, of course, himself step up into midfield, but if you're going to do that, it is surely better to use a defensive midfielder in the role (full-backs are rather more used to advancing than central defenders, so it is more natural for them to function as an auxiliary midfielder). Which is precisely what Chelsea do with Mikel Jon Obi, and Shakhtar Donetsk with Mariusz Lewandowski, a holding midfielder allowing the full-backs greater rein.
Putting it into practice
The 2008 African Cup of Nations provides a practical example. Egypt won it with a 3-4-1-2, but that can be explained by the fact that 4-4-2 still tends to dominate tactical thinking in Africa. In fact, in 2008, aside from Egypt – and at times Cameroon - only Guinea and Morocco, both of whom used a 4-2-3-1, did not set up in some form of 4-4-2.
In their opening match, Egypt hammered Cameroon 4-2, a scoreline that flattered their opponents. They went on to add a further 10 goals in disposing of Sudan, Zambia, Angola and Côte d'Ivoire before meeting Cameroon again in the final. In that first game, Cameroon's coach Otto Pfister had his players in a 4-4-2; in the final, he opted for a 4-2-3-1 and, for the first time in the tournament, Egypt struggled for fluency. The central defender Wael Gomaa looked like a spare part, anxiously and uncertainly wandering into midfield, and, although Egypt bossed possession, they ended up beating a limited side only because of a terrible individual error from Rigobert Song.
Signs of recovery
So what, then, of Napoli? If 3-5-2 is ailing, how can their success be accounted for? The answer is that they are quite happy to have, in effect, two liberi. Napoli are not a team who need to take the initiative to the opposition; rather – as happened in the early days of catenaccio – they often sit deep, invite the opposition onto them, and break quickly, using the pace of Ezequiel Lavezzi. Having an extra spare man at the back makes it easier for them to pick up runners, and Edy Reja, their coach, is prepared to sacrifice possession for the extra defensive security.
It would not work for everybody – probably not for a top, top club, who feel the onus to take the game on themselves – but it works for Napoli. And that illuminates a universal truth about tactics: there is no right or wrong, just fads and fashions and systems that are right for particular teams at particular times.
Is 3-5-2 dying? No, but the trend towards one central striker has exposed a serious shortcoming.
Jonathan Wilson is the author of Inverting The Pyramid: The History of Football Tactics, which is shortlisted for this year's William Hill Sports Book of the Year Award.
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