Internationals this week

[Mattshark]

Adam gives away a pen and Neymar makes it 2-0.

[Rich]

Thought Neymar was going to chip it into the goal with the penalty. Disappointed!

[RedReet]

Ramires having a good second half. Starting to look a good player these days.

[Mattshark]

Lucas subbed off after an excellent performance.

[cream]

That Lucas is ****ing awesome (no It's not the one the chavs are supposed to be getting). We should sign him.

[Slinky Skills]

Simple but effective performance again by Lucas.

Neymar is class, who does it he play for?

[Mattshark]

Simple but effective performance again by Lucas.

Neymar is class, who does it he play for?

Santos

[IN_RAFA_WE_TRUST]

That Danny Kelly is a cunt, i used to think he was ok. Just said Lucas is a laughing stock in the premiership every other week or second week.

[Mattshark]

That Danny Kelly is a cunt, i used to think he was ok. Just said Lucas is a laughing stock in the premiership every other week or second week.

He clearly knows **** all about football, it is amazing how many people don't.

[Mattshark]

Stevo_football Jonathan Stevenson
Like Eng v Spa?! RT @SajChowdhury There was nothing Scotland could have learnt from playing Brazil, apart from not to play them again.

[Exiled_red]

He clearly knows **** all about football, it is amazing how many people don't.

Presumably just going off everyone else's opinion a couple of years ago, and hasn't actually seen him play for a while.

[Slinky Skills]

Santos

Thanks.

[Fernandinho]

Tuesday Games

European Championship Qualifying

Czech Republic v Liechtenstein, GpI, 16:30
Sweden v Moldova, GpE, 18:00
Israel v Georgia, GpF, 18:05
Turkey v Austria, GpA, 18:30
Romania v Luxembourg, GpD, 18:45
Estonia v Serbia, GpC, 19:30
Netherlands v Hungary, GpE, 19:30
Belgium v Azerbaijan, GpA, 19:45
Lithuania v Spain, GpI, 19:45
Northern Ireland v Slovenia, GpC, 19:45


International Match

South Korea v Montenegro, 11:00
China PR v Honduras, 11:35
Belarus v Canada, 16:00
Qatar v Russia, 16:30
Ecuador v Peru, 17:00
Cyprus v Bulgaria, 18:30
Slovakia v Denmark, 19:15
Colombia v Chile, 19:30
Greece v Poland, 19:30
Germany v Australia, 19:45 (This one will be a classic)
Rep of Ireland v Uruguay, 19:45
Ukraine v Italy, 19:45
England v Ghana, 20:00
France v Croatia, 20:00
Portugal v Finland, 20:45

[dww]

An 'Art of War' for smaller international teams

13:34, 28 Mar 2011 eircom Exclusive
Miguel Delaney
The friendly match between Ireland and Uruguay tomorrow is actually a meeting between the two teams that have most overachieved at a World Cup in terms of performance against population size. With that in mind, Miguel Delaney looks at the universal strengths all of international football's overachievers - Greece 2004, Uruguay 2010, Ireland 1990, Denmark 1992 - have in common.


Jack Charlton wasn’t too impressed. He had just watched his second game as Ireland manager, which also happened to be the country’s first ever international against Uruguay. Although his full-strength Irish team were forced to come from a goal down to claim a 1-1 draw during the April 1986 friendly, there wasn’t much in the South Americans that scared him. And, given that Uruguay were one of the more fancied teams ahead of the Mexico World Cup, it fortified Charlton’s belief that international football wasn’t the elite, elusive level many too often assumed. Peaks could be scaled.

His suspicions were confirmed when he travelled to Mexico himself. Although Diego Maradona confirmed himself as one of the all-time greats at that tournament, Charlton was – in his own words – “bored stupid”.

“After two weeks, I hardly made a note. I saw nothing new.”

So, Charlton came up with something new. He devised a system that was designed to exploit the inherent fragilities and weaknesses of even the most celebrated teams. The result, famously, was Ireland’s quarter-final appearance at the very next World Cup.

For all the criticism of the pragmatic style that Charlton used to get to that stage, the feat actually deserves more credit when placed into a broader context. Consider this. That Irish team were only the fourth country with a population of less than 4m to reach the quarter-finals of the World Cup. Their predecessors were the champions of 1930 and 1950 – Uruguay, of course – as well Northern Ireland and Wales, both in 1958. All of those achievements came, however, in a time when the football world was a lot smaller and a lot less competitive. As such, there is at least an argument that Ireland’s passage to the last eight of 1990 was one of the World Cup’s most impressive performances when looking at results against resources... until, that is, Uruguay went one better and reached the semi-finals of last summer’s World Cup.

Such history means that Tuesday’s match between the two countries isn’t just a meaningless friendly but also a meeting of two of international football’s great overachievers.

It also provides an opportunity to investigate and outline how exactly they managed it. Because, at the heart of those campaigns – and, indeed, every example of international overachievement such as Greece 2004, Denmark 1992 and Slovenia 2000-02 – are fundamental building blocks that are universally transferrable across football and can still be re-used by all lower-to-mid-tier international sides.

We’ve attempted to lay them out here, in what could hopefully be cast as something of an Art of War for all upstart footballing nations.

As Greece manager Otto Rehhagel said ahead of the 2010 World Cup, “we will play exciting football when we have Messi, Kaka, Iniesta and Xavi on the team.”

Until then, just like Rehhagel, it would do Giovanni Trapattoni’s Ireland, future Uruguay teams, Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland, Denmark, Norway and a host of others to learn these universal lessons from all of the historical examples of football alchemy.


Chapter I: build a club team, not a country

Typically, it took Roy Keane to reduce international football down to his barest bones. The former Irish captain may have been a mixed success as a manager and his autobiography may have caused a lot of controversy, but his book still offers a lot of enlightening professional insights. When talking about the 1994 World Cup campaign in which his team beat Italy and the 2002 qualification series which saw Ireland go through at the expense of Holland, Keane argued that even the most respected national teams are usually “overrated and fragile”.

That may seem outlandish to anyone who has watched Spain dominate world football over the last three years. But the world champions’ success is really down to the fact that they are, in effect, a club team. The vast majority of their starting XI are Barcelona youth graduates and, as such, grew up together to form a truly cohesive unit. The exception that proves the rule here is Xabi Alonso. When immersed into the Camp Nou midfield trio of Sergio Busquets, Xavi and Andres Iniesta for the 2010 World Cup, he notably staggered the team’s fluid play from three years’ prior. The team’s overall understanding and feeling, however, saw them through.

By contrast, most of the top international teams are collections of star players rather than cohesive teams. In the short time they generally have together, egos and club divides often clash. And most managers often look to only facilitate those differences rather than actually diminish them. Again, “overrated and fragile”.

The managers of smaller teams can start bridging the gaps in quality by building up a sense of the collective. That means, essentially, getting international players to feel and fight for each other rather than just put up with each other. When asked about the secret of Greece’s Euro 2004 success, this is exactly what Rehhagel alluded to.

“In the past, they all did as they pleased. Now, they all do what they can.”

Rehhagel later said “they were already good players, but I spent three years telling them that it was the team that counts.”

Many of the Greek players, particularly Theofanis Gekas, have spoken gushingly of the little tricks and methods Rehhagel would use to build a team spirit.

That very phrase, ‘team spirit’ is a notoriously uncatchable notion that’s hard to define. In this writer’s book, Stuttgart to Saipan, Liam Brady describes it as “the manager getting through to everyone of his players that 100% workrate is required no matter what position you’re in, no matter who you are. All the best players can get that out of their players.”

And, for all their differences, Brady definitely credits Charlton with being able to do so with Ireland.

There are many techniques to do this, of course. From Charlton’s famous late days to playing on ideals of nationalism. The latter seemed particularly evident in the fierceness of Diego Lugano and Jorge Fucile in the 2010 World Cup for Uruguay.

And the difference, then, is players going that extra mile in the closing minutes of games. Where other international players might look at a teammate’s late error in disgust, those imbued with the right spirit will instead look to help him resolve it.



Chapter II: build from the back

Given the more sophisticated skills involved, it’s very difficult for managers to coach players to become better attackers in the brief periods of international breaks. By contrast, it’s far easier to train a player to take up the right position when defending. Essentially, attacking requires understanding while defending requires organisation. The former takes time to build up but the latter can be relatively quickly imposed. What’s more, you don’t need world-class players to be well-disciplined in defence.

As such, an international manager can steal a march on opponents by putting in the right structures in defence. All of the overachievers have had this. Along the way to Italia 90, Charlton’s Ireland only conceded two goals in eight games. At Euro 2004, Greece infamously frustrated opponents – and audiences – with three successive 1-0 wins in the last three games. Denmark’s victory in the same competition 12 years earlier was built on the bedrock of Peter Schmeichel in goal and defenders like Lars Olsen and Jan Sivebaek.



Chapter III: set-pieces of cake

Just like with defensive discipline and organisation, effectiveness at set-pieces – both attacking and defending – is relatively easy to instil. All it really requires is regular practice. Once again, you don’t need Diego Maradona’s ability to perfect an organisational drill. You just need to keep doing it until it’s second nature. Brady saw this in Charlton’s Ireland. “He was good at free-kicks and corner-kicks, for and against us. We weren’t giving away any stupid goals.”

The wonder, then, is why so many managers neglect it? Compare the accuracy rate of penalty takers in rugby, for example, to corner takers in football. The rugby players will mi**** much less frequently.

At the other end, look at the frequent arguments about zonal-marking and man marking. Those debates – particularly prevalent during Rafa Benitez’s time at Liverpool – do not arise because of the inherent superiority of one system over another. They arise because neither has been trained right.

To a certain extent, this is what Trapattoni has managed at Ireland. Ireland’s second top scorer in the 2010 qualification campaign was Richard Dunne. All four of his goals came through headers from throws, corners or frees. Greece, more famously, excelled at this. Their winning goals in the Euro 2004 semi-final and final both came from corners. And when they did concede set-pieces at the other end, meanwhile, the Greek defenders didn’t offer even a suggestion of space to be exploited.

In circumstances where many international managers ignore set-pieces because of the minimal time they have with their teams, learning to executing them properly can have a disproportionately beneficial impact.



Chapter IV: mind the ‘little details’, get big results

Among the Irish press pack, Trapattoni’s repetition of the mantra “little details” has become something of an in-joke. Just a pity the players don’t think of it as often as the manager. Despite the manner in which Russia’s superior passing opened up Ireland in their October qualifying match, it was still individual errors that ultimately cost Ireland: failing to deal with a throw-in, or not tracking a run.

Again, these are all factors that can easily be fixed on the training ground. Essentially the “little details” mantra involves leaving nothing to chance: making sure you rectify anything that can actually be rectified. It involves marking players properly and learning their strengths and weaknesses. Rehhagel summed it up when he told his players and backroom team “I want to know the aftershave used by every player in Europe.”

Along the same lines, Charlton frequently defied his forgetful image by studying opposition to the point he knew every last flaw. “He would be good at coming up with a different trick for each game,” Tony Galvin says. “‘Stand at the near post against them, their player doesn’t like it if you close him down on this side, get onto him quickly.’ He’s never been given enough credit for that.”



Chapter V: integrate your stars, but don’t indulge them

Despite the smaller numbers, countries like Ireland and Uruguay usually have a population big enough to provide one or two players of genuine ability per generation. For the South Americans in the last World Cup, it was Diego Forlan and Luis Suarez. For Ireland between 1994 and 2002, it was Roy Keane. For Slovenia in 2002 even, it was Zlatko Zahovic.

A crucial balance still has to be struck here. Misuse your star – as Mick McCarthy did in a 1998 World Cup qualifier by playing Keane as a sweeper – and you don’t get maximum value. Make him the sole focus of the team, and the rest of the players find themselves unable to perform in his absence. Then, the player’s form and gifts can be become a burden as much as a bounty. What’s more, the latter situation can lead to ego problems. Note Zahovic’s infamous blow-up ahead of the 2002 World Cup.

Keane, notoriously, had a similar situation before the same tournament. But his motivations were different. And, for all the problems between Keane and his manager, McCarthy arguably struck the correct balance. Keane was undoubted centre-piece of the team and drove the side to new levels (the 1-0 win over Holland and 1-1 draw with Portugal proving particular examples). But he was also part of a system that worked relatively fluidly overall. That was one of the reasons why Ireland held it together to reach the second round.

Likewise, both Forlan and Suarez were undoubted driving forces in 2010 for Uruguay. But the team wasn’t overtly built around them. Forlan switched from the playmaking role to striker to decent effect during Suarez’s suspension in the semi-final against Holland.

As with every level, the manager must strike a balance between his players’ individual abilities and an overall system that is effective regardless of the personnel.



Chapter VI: offer something extra

Unless your team has a Roy Keane-like star who can win games on his own, these building blocks will really do no more than make you difficult to beat. That is what Trapattoni has done so far with Ireland. But where a manager really earns credit is by offering something extra, an innovation that transforms valiant draws into famous victories.

Perhaps most famously, Alf Ramsey devised a 4-3-3 formation that took Ipswich from the Second Division to the top of the First within a year and then England to the only major trophy in their history. Such tactical leaps are rare though. Rather, managers can make a difference with smaller innovations.

Kevin Moran, for example, pointed out the consternation Charlton’s side caused in opposition defences by pressing teams so vigorously.

“They couldn’t get out of their own half. They didn’t understand what was going on. And it caused so much chaos. Just one simple ball played in behind and everybody chasing it.”

Rehhagel’s Greece have been painted as similarly one-dimensional but their drive to Euro 2004 was more nuanced. They actual used slick passing interchanges to defeat Portugal in the tournament’s opening game before tailoring their system to negate France and the Czech Republic’s famed attacks in the knock-out stages.

The result, ultimately, was one of the greatest upsets in international history. Since then, Rehhagel’s overall approach may have been rendered obsolete and Ireland’s success consigned to the past. But many of the principles remain as powerful now as they ever were.

[SK]

Are the Spanish going to play their game or is the pitch in too bad a shape for their uber stars?