Sorry if it's in the wrong forum but it's such a typical bitter article I just had to post it.... 
We only asked!
“The council has bent over backwards for Liverpool but not us...” — any Evertonian, 2000-2007.
Fact: Everton has never formally requested permission to build on Stanley Park.
Fact: We made a general enquiry to see if it was feasible.
Fact: We were told it was protected under “Victorian covenant”.
Fact: LFC, at a later date, were indeed told the opposite.
Fact: We never moaned about this when we had the chance.
Fact: The reason we didn’t can be summed-up in two words: King’s Dock.
For anyone who’s forgotten. For anyone who was only 10 at the time and now has a burning sense of injustice. For the record. Here’s what happened, or rather what didn’t, once and for all. I was there and I attest to these facts. Forgive me if some old ground is covered but seemingly it needs doing. The chronological context is important, in my view.
[Point of interest to declare: I was a founder member / treasurer/ minute-taker of Goodison for Ever-ton / GFE. I have no connection whatever with KEIOC.]
In Dec 1996 Peter Johnson announced he wanted Everton to leave GP. He said he’d explored two options. Option 1: redevelop Goodison Park. Option 2: leave, preferably for a site on the Kirkby Golf Course. He said “Option 1” (as referred to in the club’s newspaper of the time, The Evertonian) had failed and a feasibility study showed that Goodison could not be redeveloped beyond 47,000.
In Jan 1997, in the wake of the Kanchelskis sale, and knowing the parlous, generally unappreciated (certainly by manager Joe Royle) state of Everton’s finances (two months earlier we broke our transfer record for Nick Barmby and it was generally assumed the accounts were healthy, when in fact we were already £7m in debt) a group called Goodison for Ever-ton (sic) — aka GFE — set itself up with one remit only. Namely, to challenge the assumption that Goodison Park couldn’t be redeveloped. What PJ didn’t know was that the GFE had a club insider and knew that no such feasibility study had been undertaken. The GFE asked PJ to produce it. If he did, and, if it was as stated, the GFE said they would accept the inevitability that Everton had to leave Goodison Park.
At a meeting with the GFE on the Monday of the re-run Grand National (IRA bomb threat), PJ said he would never release the study. Furthermore, he said, he would undertake a supporters’ vote at the last game of that season v Chelsea, to gauge attitudes to a move to Kirkby Golf Course. He told the GFE that the literature accompanying the ballot would be heavily swayed towards the move. He also said that for political reasons he couldn’t say, specifically, that the club was destined for Kirkby Golf Course but that he would be launching a PR campaign across local media to make it clear this was his preferred location (hence the laughably famous “bus blockade day” as covered by local media at the time). When asked how he could be so confident that the media would be on his side, he simply stated: “Oh, I’m sure they will.” He refused to allow the GFE to produce any “counter argument” within the ballot brochure. As he predicted, the GFE went on to be slated vehemently in the local press.
In May 1997, the club undertook a heavily flawed, unsupervised ballot which revealed that 82% of those who voted (sic) wished to move (implicitly to Kirkby Golf Course). At no point in the lead-up to the ballot had emotions ever touched on the fact that Everton were planning to leave the City of Liverpool. It was a non-issue.
Four days after the vote, PJ announced that as well as Kirkby Golf Course, the club may also consider sites at: Burtonwood, Cronton and Speke. Generally, although it was clear that (despite the best efforts of the GFE) an undeniable majority of fans were prepared to leave Goodison, most felt duped.
Having achieved his mandate, PJ proceeded to do precisely nothing about the proposed relocation of Everton during the whole period from May 1997 to his departure as Chairman and majority shareholder in Nov 1998. The reasons chiefly stemmed from the fall-out that reigned across the club as a result of the “resignation” of Joe Royle in March 1997, the non-capture of a “world class manager” in spring 1997, the desperate reappointment of Howard Kendall Mk III as late as July 1997, the tumult of the club’s on-field travails culminating in the last day survival versus Coventry in May 1998, the sacking of HK, the appointment in July 1998 of Walter Smith, the spending of £20m (Collins, Dacourt, Materrazzi, Bakayoko et al) which the club didn’t possess and the chaos that led to the sale of Duncan Ferguson in Nov 1998, which inadvertently exposed the true nature of the club’s finances for the first time (some £29m in debt).
Knowing that the ground issue would resurface again at some point, the GFE utilised the period between May 1997 and Nov 1998 to re-galvanise and, as well as raising its own funds through bucket collections and events, also secured the support of two very well connected Evertonians. One of these was prepared to back the GFE financially in its attempt to secure the services of the Sheffield architects, Ward McHugh Assoc, who had stated that, contrary to PJ’s assertion, GP could indeed be redeveloped to at least a 47,000 unobstructed capacity and possibly 55,000.
Thanks to the financial backing of this noted supporter (who I won’t name), the GFE/Ward McHugh study was duly published after the departure of PJ. At this time, the GFE was informed by club secretary Michael Dunford that the feasibility study PJ said he’d undertaken into the redevelopment of Goodison had (as was known) never existed. The GFE stressed that not only had this wasted two and half years of the club’s valuable time but that, given spiralling construction costs, time was fast running out to start a phased project of rebuilding GP (similar to those underway at many grounds around the Premiership at that time).
Basically the GFE/ Ward McHugh report produced two chief alternatives for redeveloping GP. The first was a “same footprint” option. The second — which could have delivered a stadium of some 55,000 — depended on the club securing permission to encroach onto Stanley Park (roughly the area in front of the megastore and alongside the Marie Curie daffodil field) with a consequent reconfiguration of Walton Lane to snake around the new perimeter.
Whilst these options were being considered by Everton, it was known that LFC were searching sites as far afield as Kirkby or Speke in order to relocate their club. A further option was to redevelop Anfield — on its current site — but it was felt that this was too restrictive as it would be impossible to achieve a desired 60,000 capacity.
At some stage in 1999, Liverpool City Council approached LFC about the possibility of the the club taking up residence at a proposed new stadium at King’s Dock. Sure that LFC would leap at the chance to expand its Liver Bird culture on the banks of the Mersey, LCC was stunned to hear LFC reject the idea out-of-hand based on the fact that the capacity would only be 50,000.
In early 2000 (Bill Kenwright only assumed control at the millennium), Everton, by now keen on the idea of the slight encroachment onto Stanley Park, approached LCC to ask how feasible it would be. LCC rejected the idea, citing, among other things, the Victorian covenant that existed. In fact, the then CEO of LCC was at pains to publicly reassert Council leader, Mike Storey’s prior assertion (1998) that the city’s parks were “safe forever” (Google "Liverpool city parks safe forever").
At Easter 2000, LCC was approached by Rick Parry to enquire about the possibility of LFC building a completely new 70,000 capacity stadium on Stanley Park. If this was not possible, said Parry, then LFC may have to go beyond the city.
It is purely a matter of conjecture as to whether LFC had got wind of Everton’s Stanley Park query. It is further conjecture as to the extent of the role (if any) Parry played in solving LCC’s subsequent dilemma but nevertheless, by June of 2000, several cards slotted neatly into various slots. All within weeks.
LCC’s dilemma was: they could not risk losing LFC but they couldn’t very well agree to them building on / decimating Stanley Park having informally told Everton, weeks earlier, that it was impossible. It is also known — fact — that LCC had never previously considered Everton as Kings Dock tenants.
Curiously, though, just after Easter 2000, not long after Rick Parry had enquired about Stanley Park, the first Everton for Kings Dock media stories emerged. Suddenly Everton ceased interest in Stanley Park. Unable to believe LFC had spurned it, BK leapt at the chance to bring the “Banks of the Royal Blue Mersey” to reality. Postcard heaven. Having given financial assurances to all parties (not forgetting LCC’s willingness to co-fund) Everton announced publicly that they would seriously explore the Kings Dock (hence the eventual arrival of Paul Gregg).
Amazingly, just weeks later in June 2000, to everyone’s surprise, Parry announced that LFC had finally solved its stadium dilemma and that a solution had been “under our noses all along” (verbatim quote): namely a new stadium on Stanley Park. In fact, the tone of Parry’s PR at the time was “stupid us, we just didn’t notice.” Very, very un-Rick Parry.
However, even more amazing than LCC’s apparent u-turn on its “parks safe forever” policy, was Everton’s complete silence on the clear double standards at work. By now, though, Everton was in full Kings Dock mode (incidentally dismissed by the GFE as a financial non-starter — Liverpool Echo, November 2000 — and therefore another waste of valuable time) and no longer cared about Stanley Park “inner city” trivia. Instead Everton foolishly believed it had gained the upper-hand over LFC.
The GFE urged Kenwright to complain to LCC about the dual standards. He was reluctant to do so. The GFE has never had any purposeful involvement with Everton since.
In October 2000, Everton duly lodged its Kings Dock bid and one month later a second fans’ ballot was taken, with largely the same results as 1997. Thereafter the GFE effectively wound up. Incidentally, despite very public accusations to the contrary, the remainder of funds collected for that Ward McHugh feasibility study (paid for, remember, by that GFE supporting, ahem, well-connected Evertonian) have remained in the organisation’s bank account in Manchester. **
When the KD dream unsurprisingly collapsed in 2003, it was then far too late for Kenwright to complain to LCC about double-standards. He knew it. LCC, which had given Everton more time, some more time, and then even more time (as well as the promise of co-funding) knew it too. And Rick Parry knew it also. Meanwhile seven years (now 10) had elapsed since Everton should have “bitten the bullet” and start a phased redevelopment of GP which, in all likelihood, would have been completed by 2002 (the financial backing was there, if it wanted, as Everton well knows — but that’s another story) probably around the time a certain Wayne Rooney was emerging.
So, to set the record straight, Everton has very little room for complaint with LCC. However, we did ask about Stanley Park. We never made it formal. We were told there was little point. The fact remains, though, that LFC got a very different answer. We should have screamed Blue murder while we had the chance. We didn’t. And despite my GFE past, I now believe, for financial reasons, we must sadly leave GP (but not for Kirkby). We missed the boat, basically.
We only asked!
“The council has bent over backwards for Liverpool but not us...” — any Evertonian, 2000-2007.
Fact: Everton has never formally requested permission to build on Stanley Park.
Fact: We made a general enquiry to see if it was feasible.
Fact: We were told it was protected under “Victorian covenant”.
Fact: LFC, at a later date, were indeed told the opposite.
Fact: We never moaned about this when we had the chance.
Fact: The reason we didn’t can be summed-up in two words: King’s Dock.
For anyone who’s forgotten. For anyone who was only 10 at the time and now has a burning sense of injustice. For the record. Here’s what happened, or rather what didn’t, once and for all. I was there and I attest to these facts. Forgive me if some old ground is covered but seemingly it needs doing. The chronological context is important, in my view.
[Point of interest to declare: I was a founder member / treasurer/ minute-taker of Goodison for Ever-ton / GFE. I have no connection whatever with KEIOC.]
In Dec 1996 Peter Johnson announced he wanted Everton to leave GP. He said he’d explored two options. Option 1: redevelop Goodison Park. Option 2: leave, preferably for a site on the Kirkby Golf Course. He said “Option 1” (as referred to in the club’s newspaper of the time, The Evertonian) had failed and a feasibility study showed that Goodison could not be redeveloped beyond 47,000.
In Jan 1997, in the wake of the Kanchelskis sale, and knowing the parlous, generally unappreciated (certainly by manager Joe Royle) state of Everton’s finances (two months earlier we broke our transfer record for Nick Barmby and it was generally assumed the accounts were healthy, when in fact we were already £7m in debt) a group called Goodison for Ever-ton (sic) — aka GFE — set itself up with one remit only. Namely, to challenge the assumption that Goodison Park couldn’t be redeveloped. What PJ didn’t know was that the GFE had a club insider and knew that no such feasibility study had been undertaken. The GFE asked PJ to produce it. If he did, and, if it was as stated, the GFE said they would accept the inevitability that Everton had to leave Goodison Park.
At a meeting with the GFE on the Monday of the re-run Grand National (IRA bomb threat), PJ said he would never release the study. Furthermore, he said, he would undertake a supporters’ vote at the last game of that season v Chelsea, to gauge attitudes to a move to Kirkby Golf Course. He told the GFE that the literature accompanying the ballot would be heavily swayed towards the move. He also said that for political reasons he couldn’t say, specifically, that the club was destined for Kirkby Golf Course but that he would be launching a PR campaign across local media to make it clear this was his preferred location (hence the laughably famous “bus blockade day” as covered by local media at the time). When asked how he could be so confident that the media would be on his side, he simply stated: “Oh, I’m sure they will.” He refused to allow the GFE to produce any “counter argument” within the ballot brochure. As he predicted, the GFE went on to be slated vehemently in the local press.
In May 1997, the club undertook a heavily flawed, unsupervised ballot which revealed that 82% of those who voted (sic) wished to move (implicitly to Kirkby Golf Course). At no point in the lead-up to the ballot had emotions ever touched on the fact that Everton were planning to leave the City of Liverpool. It was a non-issue.
Four days after the vote, PJ announced that as well as Kirkby Golf Course, the club may also consider sites at: Burtonwood, Cronton and Speke. Generally, although it was clear that (despite the best efforts of the GFE) an undeniable majority of fans were prepared to leave Goodison, most felt duped.
Having achieved his mandate, PJ proceeded to do precisely nothing about the proposed relocation of Everton during the whole period from May 1997 to his departure as Chairman and majority shareholder in Nov 1998. The reasons chiefly stemmed from the fall-out that reigned across the club as a result of the “resignation” of Joe Royle in March 1997, the non-capture of a “world class manager” in spring 1997, the desperate reappointment of Howard Kendall Mk III as late as July 1997, the tumult of the club’s on-field travails culminating in the last day survival versus Coventry in May 1998, the sacking of HK, the appointment in July 1998 of Walter Smith, the spending of £20m (Collins, Dacourt, Materrazzi, Bakayoko et al) which the club didn’t possess and the chaos that led to the sale of Duncan Ferguson in Nov 1998, which inadvertently exposed the true nature of the club’s finances for the first time (some £29m in debt).
Knowing that the ground issue would resurface again at some point, the GFE utilised the period between May 1997 and Nov 1998 to re-galvanise and, as well as raising its own funds through bucket collections and events, also secured the support of two very well connected Evertonians. One of these was prepared to back the GFE financially in its attempt to secure the services of the Sheffield architects, Ward McHugh Assoc, who had stated that, contrary to PJ’s assertion, GP could indeed be redeveloped to at least a 47,000 unobstructed capacity and possibly 55,000.
Thanks to the financial backing of this noted supporter (who I won’t name), the GFE/Ward McHugh study was duly published after the departure of PJ. At this time, the GFE was informed by club secretary Michael Dunford that the feasibility study PJ said he’d undertaken into the redevelopment of Goodison had (as was known) never existed. The GFE stressed that not only had this wasted two and half years of the club’s valuable time but that, given spiralling construction costs, time was fast running out to start a phased project of rebuilding GP (similar to those underway at many grounds around the Premiership at that time).
Basically the GFE/ Ward McHugh report produced two chief alternatives for redeveloping GP. The first was a “same footprint” option. The second — which could have delivered a stadium of some 55,000 — depended on the club securing permission to encroach onto Stanley Park (roughly the area in front of the megastore and alongside the Marie Curie daffodil field) with a consequent reconfiguration of Walton Lane to snake around the new perimeter.
Whilst these options were being considered by Everton, it was known that LFC were searching sites as far afield as Kirkby or Speke in order to relocate their club. A further option was to redevelop Anfield — on its current site — but it was felt that this was too restrictive as it would be impossible to achieve a desired 60,000 capacity.
At some stage in 1999, Liverpool City Council approached LFC about the possibility of the the club taking up residence at a proposed new stadium at King’s Dock. Sure that LFC would leap at the chance to expand its Liver Bird culture on the banks of the Mersey, LCC was stunned to hear LFC reject the idea out-of-hand based on the fact that the capacity would only be 50,000.
In early 2000 (Bill Kenwright only assumed control at the millennium), Everton, by now keen on the idea of the slight encroachment onto Stanley Park, approached LCC to ask how feasible it would be. LCC rejected the idea, citing, among other things, the Victorian covenant that existed. In fact, the then CEO of LCC was at pains to publicly reassert Council leader, Mike Storey’s prior assertion (1998) that the city’s parks were “safe forever” (Google "Liverpool city parks safe forever").
At Easter 2000, LCC was approached by Rick Parry to enquire about the possibility of LFC building a completely new 70,000 capacity stadium on Stanley Park. If this was not possible, said Parry, then LFC may have to go beyond the city.
It is purely a matter of conjecture as to whether LFC had got wind of Everton’s Stanley Park query. It is further conjecture as to the extent of the role (if any) Parry played in solving LCC’s subsequent dilemma but nevertheless, by June of 2000, several cards slotted neatly into various slots. All within weeks.
LCC’s dilemma was: they could not risk losing LFC but they couldn’t very well agree to them building on / decimating Stanley Park having informally told Everton, weeks earlier, that it was impossible. It is also known — fact — that LCC had never previously considered Everton as Kings Dock tenants.
Curiously, though, just after Easter 2000, not long after Rick Parry had enquired about Stanley Park, the first Everton for Kings Dock media stories emerged. Suddenly Everton ceased interest in Stanley Park. Unable to believe LFC had spurned it, BK leapt at the chance to bring the “Banks of the Royal Blue Mersey” to reality. Postcard heaven. Having given financial assurances to all parties (not forgetting LCC’s willingness to co-fund) Everton announced publicly that they would seriously explore the Kings Dock (hence the eventual arrival of Paul Gregg).
Amazingly, just weeks later in June 2000, to everyone’s surprise, Parry announced that LFC had finally solved its stadium dilemma and that a solution had been “under our noses all along” (verbatim quote): namely a new stadium on Stanley Park. In fact, the tone of Parry’s PR at the time was “stupid us, we just didn’t notice.” Very, very un-Rick Parry.
However, even more amazing than LCC’s apparent u-turn on its “parks safe forever” policy, was Everton’s complete silence on the clear double standards at work. By now, though, Everton was in full Kings Dock mode (incidentally dismissed by the GFE as a financial non-starter — Liverpool Echo, November 2000 — and therefore another waste of valuable time) and no longer cared about Stanley Park “inner city” trivia. Instead Everton foolishly believed it had gained the upper-hand over LFC.
The GFE urged Kenwright to complain to LCC about the dual standards. He was reluctant to do so. The GFE has never had any purposeful involvement with Everton since.
In October 2000, Everton duly lodged its Kings Dock bid and one month later a second fans’ ballot was taken, with largely the same results as 1997. Thereafter the GFE effectively wound up. Incidentally, despite very public accusations to the contrary, the remainder of funds collected for that Ward McHugh feasibility study (paid for, remember, by that GFE supporting, ahem, well-connected Evertonian) have remained in the organisation’s bank account in Manchester. **
When the KD dream unsurprisingly collapsed in 2003, it was then far too late for Kenwright to complain to LCC about double-standards. He knew it. LCC, which had given Everton more time, some more time, and then even more time (as well as the promise of co-funding) knew it too. And Rick Parry knew it also. Meanwhile seven years (now 10) had elapsed since Everton should have “bitten the bullet” and start a phased redevelopment of GP which, in all likelihood, would have been completed by 2002 (the financial backing was there, if it wanted, as Everton well knows — but that’s another story) probably around the time a certain Wayne Rooney was emerging.
So, to set the record straight, Everton has very little room for complaint with LCC. However, we did ask about Stanley Park. We never made it formal. We were told there was little point. The fact remains, though, that LFC got a very different answer. We should have screamed Blue murder while we had the chance. We didn’t. And despite my GFE past, I now believe, for financial reasons, we must sadly leave GP (but not for Kirkby). We missed the boat, basically.
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